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J. ROBERT BROWN, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sarbanes-Oxley ("SOX" or "the Act") was adopted in a rush,
political expediency necessitating that something be done before the
2002 election to minimize voter backlash from the collapse of Enron and
WorldCom. Two arguably moribund bills, with very different
philosophies, were cobbled together, augmented, and passed in a flurry
of activity,' ostensibly enacting the most far-reaching reforms of the
nation's business practices since the Great Depression.2
SOX, named after its putative sponsors,3 sought to improve
corporate disclosure by increasing the gatekeeper function of outside
accounting firms and heightening the supervisory role of top officers and
the board.4 It separated accounting and consulting services, increased
the strength and independence of the audit committee, and required
certification of financial statements by officers and assessment of
internal controls by managers and auditors.5
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. I want to thank Darius Dills
at the University of Oklahoma for invaluable research in connection with this effort. Teresa
Gabaldon, Donna Nagy, Bruce Price, Celia Taylor, and Eli Wald provided very useful
comments. The views and errors are, however, mine.
1. See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1003-06 (2005).
2. So says President Bush and some commentators. See Stephen M. Bainbridge &
Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 301. Perhaps this assertion too should be put to empirical analysis.
3. One wonders whether Congressman Oxley appreciates the eternal linking of his name
to a bill that has been so criticized. In the aftermath, he has not always been happy with the
consequences of the Act. See William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-
Oxley: The Irony of "Going Private," 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 160 (2006) ("Congress apparently
will not rethink its choices, despite admissions by Congressman Oxley that the act is too
inflexible for smaller companies.").
4. See Celia R. Taylor, Breaking the Bank: Reconsidering Central Bank of Denver after
Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, 71 MO. L. REV. 367, 367-68 (2006).
5. See infra Part IV.A-B.
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SOX engendered an immediate cascade of criticism, much of the
excoriation coming from the Academy, especially those adhering to the
view that a corporation was a "nexus of contracts."6 For them, the Act
fixed non-existent problems, generated costs that exceeded benefits, and
relied on approaches that took no notice of definitive economic data;
"quack corporate governance" in a phrase.7
SOX suffered from uneven craftsmanship and was not fully vetted in
the traditional manner.8 Process, however, did not fully explain the
immediacy and strength of the vituperative attacks. Instead, the Act
amounted to an affront, indeed a rejection, of the view within the
Academy that corporations were a "nexus of contracts" and that the
evolution of corporate law was a race to the top. SOX did so by
replacing enabling rules with categorical prohibitions and riding
roughshod over hallowed principles of Delaware law.
This Essay will do three things. It will examine the position of these
contractarians and briefly discuss the normative implications of their
views. Second, it will examine their reaction to SOX and the reasons for
the deep, almost indiscriminate, hostility. Finally, the Essay will
undertake an examination of significant provisions of SOX to determine
whether, in fact, they are as harmful and irrational as some have
suggested or whether, to preview the conclusion, the jury remains out,
the empirical basis for firm conclusions still unavailable.
II. NEXUS OF CONTRACTS AND THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A widespread consensus exists in the Academy that corporate law
should be designed to promote the most efficient use of assets. For
some, this will occur only where managers and owners can bargain for
6. The stridency of the criticism was even more noticeable given the view held by some
that the reforms contained in the Act were not all that significant. See Lawrence A.
Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might
Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 941-42 (2003). Others took a more balanced view of the Act.
See Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization" to "Mixed Governance" in Corporate Law: A
Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 721-23 (2005).
7. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1585-91 (2005).
8. Because of the rushed nature of some aspects of SOX, opponents have tended to
label the entire Act as rushed. See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 89
(2003) (concluding that in adopting SOX, Congress was "regulating in a panic"). To the
extent "rushed" signifies an absence of hearings, deliberation, and consideration of the
relevant issues, this is factually wrong. See Nagy, supra note 1, at 996-1003 (discussing




the most efficient relationships, one that uniquely reflects the interests
of the particular parties involved. They view corporations as a "nexus of
contracts" and support regulatory regimes that promote private
ordering. Contractarians, therefore, favor enabling provisions where
parties can opt in or out and eschew the "one size fits all" approach of
categorical rules.
As a matter of theory, the "nexus of contracts" approach has
considerable merit. The importance of, and benefits from, private
ordering are useful considerations in any assessment of corporate law.9
As a normative matter, however, the approach is far less valuable."
While private ordering may theoretically be more efficient than
categorical rules, there is no guarantee that in practice parties will enter
into efficient bargains, either individually or in the aggregate. Market
failure, disparities in bargaining, imperfect and asymmetrical
information, moral hazards, satisficing, and the requirement of rational
actors all conspire against efficiency. As a result, nothing prevents
private ordering from resulting in greater inefficiencies than mandatory
rules.
These normative concerns arise with particular force in the
corporate context where management has an incentive to engage in self-
serving behavior while shareholders suffer from a number of obvious
disabilities, including the problem of free riders and rational ignorance.
Logic would suggest that private ordering would reflect these dynamics,
with agreements tending to favor managerial self-interest rather than
efficiency."
Contractarians attempted to overcome these concerns through
resort to a correcting mechanism. Management entering into an
inefficient arrangement would eventually see share prices fall, making
the company susceptible to a hostile takeover. Once acquired, the new
9. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 3 (2002) ("Accordingly, a model is properly judged by its predictive power with
respect to the phenomena it purports to explain, not by whether it is a valid description of an
objective reality.").
10. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 863 (1997)
(reviewing LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (1995)) ("In my
view, however, contractarianism claims only to offer a richer metaphor than do traditional
entity-based theories and, as such, a more useful heuristic for understanding corporations.").
11. At least where the two diverge. Private ordering motivated by managerial self-
interest will sometimes result in efficient behavior.
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managers would undo the arrangement and redeploy the assets in a
more efficient, higher-use manner."
The availability of the correcting mechanism simplified the
contractarian position. They did not have to argue that management
would always or even frequently bargain in an efficient manner. It was
enough that efficient arrangements were possible and that market
mechanisms would allow only the efficient ones to survive."
Although the view still occasionally surfaces,' scholars in general no
longer rely on hostile takeovers as the guarantor of efficiency." How
could they? The market hardly exists. 16 Ironically, its demise came not
from categorical rules imposed at the federal level" but from enabling
provisions under state law.
18
12. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 113 (1965); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role
of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1173-74
(1981); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841-43 (1981); Lucian Bebchuk, Comment,
The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1030-31 (1982).
13. Thus, as two contractarians noted: "The market for corporate control provides the
glue that holds together the nexus of contracts." Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein,
Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1,
25 (1990).
14. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law,
REGULATION, Spring 2003, at 30, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=389403 [hereinafter
Bainbridge, Creeping Federalization] ("Among other things, such firms become more
vulnerable to a hostile takeover and subsequent management purges. Corporate managers
therefore have strong incentives to incorporate the business in a state offering rules preferred
by investors."); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 562 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director
Primacy] ("Also, an active market for corporate control, ever-rising rates of shareholder
litigation, and, some say, activist shareholders constrain director conduct.").
15. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 56 (2002) ("Takeover regulation
therefore has substantially diluted firms' agency-cost-control arsenal, forcing them to resort
to second-best incentive devices and control mechanisms.").
16. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate Performance: The
Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 356, 382 (2004) (noting that hostile takeovers "virtually disappeared as a corporate
governance device at the start of the 1990s"). Recognizing this, adherents have searched for
other disciplining market mechanisms, with hedge funds apparently the new hope. See
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 06-16, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=919881 (undertaking study to determine whether
"hedge funds [are] the 'Holy Grail' of corporate governance").
17. Which is not to say that some do not continue to criticize federal regulation,
something put in place in 1968. See Ribstein, supra note 15, at 55-56 ("Extensive takeover
regulation began in 1968 with the Williams Act, which imposed disclosure requirements on
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The demise of hostile takeovers as a significant disciplining
mechanism also altered the debate over Delaware law and the so-called
race to the top, a central tenet of the contractarian view.19 Under the
internal affairs doctrine, the state of incorporation regulates the rights of
managers and owners. It is management, however, that determines
where to incorporate and presumably selects the state that best meets its
objectives."
In selecting the appropriate state, management has, broadly
speaking, two possible motivations. One is efficiency. The company
will incorporate in a jurisdiction that allows for the most efficient
operations. The other is self-interest. The company will incorporate in
a jurisdiction that allows managers to favor their own interests over
those of investors, irrespective of the efficiency of the decision.21
For contractarians, the answer was efficiency. With Delaware
engaging in an almost continuous process of eliminating categorical
bidders and required them to structure their bids to give incumbent directors time to defend.
This reduced potential gains from risky hostile bids, and therefore takeovers' effectiveness as
a monitoring device." (footnote omitted)).
18. Management has a host of defensive tactics that can substantially raise the cost of
acquisitions, particularly the poison pill. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV &
Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002) (analyzing the impact of poison pills and
staggered boards). Of course, some have challenged this view. See Ronald J. Gilson, The
Poison Pill in Japan: The Missing Infrastructure, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 21, 39 ("In
summary, the U.S. experience has been that a poison pill has not frequently blocked a hostile
bid, once made, from being considered by the shareholders. The pill will give target
management that opposes the bid time to explain its position, to negotiate with the hostile
bidder, or to develop an alternative strategy or bidder. Three critical corporate governance
institutions-independent directors, the Delaware courts, and the capital market-combine
to cause the pill to operate largely as a negotiating tool, rather than as a means to maintain
company independence.").
19. It may be the case, as some have written, that "[t]his thirty-year debate has reached a
stalemate, with neither side yielding much ground to the other." Renee M. Jones, Does
Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 879, 883-84 (2006). Obstinacy does not, however, render resolution
unimportant.
20. Reincorporation generally requires both board and shareholder approval. The
transaction is, however, initiated by the board. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1437, 1458, 1470 n.118 (1992).
21. There tends to be an all or nothing approach in discussing this issue. A race to the
bottom may explain some corporate law reforms but certainly not all. See J. Robert Brown,
Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U.
RICH. L. REV. 317, 319-20 (2004).
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rules,22 public companies selected the state because of the increased
opportunities for private ordering and the efficiencies that would result
from these decisions.' The availability of hostile takeovers meant that
it did not matter how often managers and shareholders actually entered
into efficient arrangements; the inefficient ones would eventually be
weeded out.24 The existence of a correcting mechanism allowed
contractarians to be uncompromising. Enabling provisions, by their
very nature, were beneficial.'
With the disappearance of hostile acquisitions, however, the analysis
had to shift. No longer able to show the ineluctable elimination of
inefficient bargains, contractarians had to argue that the enabling
approach in Delaware resulted in greater aggregate efficiency. That is,
while conceding that some managers and owners would enter into
inefficient arrangements, arrangements that would not necessarily be
eliminated by market forces, it was still the case that the enabling
approach, in the aggregate, produced more efficient behavior.
Contractarians attempted to address this new reality by pointing to a
handful of event studies purporting to show that share prices increased
upon reincorporation in Delaware.26 This ostensibly represented the
22. See the article by Delaware Chancellor William T. Allen, Contracts and
Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) (stating that
the contractarian model is now the "dominant legal academic view"). The best example may
be the elimination of the prohibition on discriminating among shareholders of the same class.
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985). Delaware was the first
state to permit companies, in their charter, to waive liability for directors. For the
international perspective on this, see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 20 (2004) ("All shareholders of the same series
of a class should be treated equally.").
23. Some have taken the position that the state law requirements are largely enabling,
with the remaining categorical rules "trivial." See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 542 (1990).
24. Of course, with one substantial exception: they did not favor broad managerial
discretion in the area of antitakeover tactics. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at
1201-03.
25. Thus, even fiduciary duties should be subject to private ordering. See Butler &
Ribstein, supra note 13, at 32 ("[T]he fundamentally contractual nature of fiduciary duties
means that they should be subject to the same presumption in favor of private ordering that
applies to other contracts.").
26. See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State
Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1784-96 (2002). Some have
attempted to show that particular categories of issuers benefit from incorporation in
Delaware. Some, for example, argue that IPOs of Delaware companies receive increased
valuation. See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559, 1560 (2002). The analysis proves too much. If it was that clear that incorporating in
Delaware would improve share prices, then all similarly situated companies would do so,
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market's judgment that Delaware's law was more efficient than the
alternatives. The studies, however, did not make a strong case. They
were inconsistent in result27 and short-term in horizon,2 s offering no view
on the long-term impact.2 ' They also conflicted with the facts on the
ground. To the extent reincorporation resulted in a predictable increase
in share prices, the impetus for engaging in the transaction ought to
have come from financial experts. In fact, the literature indicated that
they were promoted by lawyers, not investment bankers.' Finally,
common sense evidence suggested that in at least some instances,
corporate law reform had managerial self-interest at its core."
But the approach had a more fundamental problem. The argument
that Delaware's law, as formulated, was efficient, did not speak to the
which they do not. See Bebchuk et al., supra, at 1789 ("While Daines's study makes an
impressive effort to control for as many parameters as possible, including type of business and
firm size, it nonetheless remains true that if in a group of seemingly identical firms, some
firms incorporate in Delaware and others do not, there must be omitted variables that
produce this differential behavior. This is all the more true if it is supposed that one choice
produces a substantial increase in firm value and the other does not.").
27. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 26, at 1791-92 ("These six studies ... present a rather
mixed picture. Roberta Romano's study, the earliest and most influential of the six, found a
positive abnormal return of 4.18%. However, three of the subsequent five studies found
abnormal returns in the vicinity of 1%, and two of the subsequent five studies, including the
most recent event study which used the largest sample size, did not find an abnormal return
that differed from zero in a statistically significant way." (footnotes omitted)).
28. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359,2384 n.76 (1998).
29. Similarly, during the takeover era, the tendency was to note the short-term value of
acquisitions to the bidder (generally neutral) without attempting to assess the longer-term
impact. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., In Defense of Management Buyouts, 65 TUL. L. REV. 57, 96
(1990).
30. The literature identifies lawyers as the interest group most likely to promote
reincorporations. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 470 (1987) ("[T]he rules that
Delaware supplies often can be viewed as attempts to maximize revenues to the bar, and
more particularly to an elite cadre of Wilmington lawyers who practice corporate law in the
state.").
31. Not all corporate law reforms are explainable as a product of the race to the bottom.
See Brown, supra note 21. One that is, however, is the widespread adoption of waiver of
liability provisions. They benefit management by allowing the articles to include a provision
that eliminates monetary damages for breach of the duty of care. Nonetheless, in the last
twenty years, a remarkably short period of time for legal reform, all fifty states put some type
of reduced liability provision in place. While a possible example of "private ordering," the
provisions have become ubiquitous, suggesting that they are not in fact a result of individual
negotiation. Moreover, even if a waiver were necessary to attract the most efficient
management in a particular case, the provision applied to all subsequent managers. Thus,
these provisions essentially result in shareholders ceding away damages for mismanagement
on an indefinite basis irrespective of the particular management involved.
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impact of reforms.32 Thus, the data did not address the consequences of
regulatory changes, including the imposition of categorical rules. Doing
so would create a new mix of legal requirements that might or might not
result in greater overall efficiency.
III. THE REJECTION OF SOX
In the corporate law realm, scholars have characterized the
contractarian view as "dominant"33 and Delaware as the "genius" of
American corporate law. '  SOX, by rejecting both, amounted to an
uncomfortable shock. The Act imposed categorical requirements35 and
preempted a number of state law provisions,36 both inconsistent with the
"nexus of contracts" approach and the race to the top.37
Predictably, SOX generated a deluge of criticism, much of it quite
harsh.38 Roberta Romano called SOX "quack" corporate law and
concluded, after a survey of economic literature, that four pieces of the
32. In fact, Delaware law has opted for a system of lax regulation of insiders, requiring
periodic federal intervention. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate
Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). Any study of the
efficiency of Delaware law includes a regime that is limited by categorical rules imposed at
the federal level.
33. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1744 n.50 (2006) (citing an early source that
described the view as the "dominant legal academic view").
34. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 554 (2002)
("Indeed, the dominant view in corporate law scholarship is that allowing Delaware to
dominate national corporate law is not a problematic feature, but rather an important virtue,
indeed the 'genius,' of American corporate law.").
35. Indeed, Congress did not even consider their literature on the subject. See Romano,
supra note 7, at 1602 ("In the frantic political environment in which SOX was enacted,
legislators adopted proposals of policy entrepreneurs with neither careful consideration nor
assimilation of the literature at odds with the policy prescriptions.").
36. In truth, there was little in the legislation that could not have been fixed with more
robust fiduciary duties. Unwilling to leave the matter to the decisions of the Delaware courts
and the legislature, Congress effectively federalized important aspects of corporate law.
37. See Ribstein, supra note 15, at 57 ("The Sarbanes-Oxley Act changes course from
this contractual approach to corporate regulation.").
38. Not all contractarians viewed SOX this way. See Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both
Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of
Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 355 (2003) ("Sarbanes-Oxley was a
measured and appropriate response to the abject failures in U.S. corporate governance
typified by Enron. These failures were not merely failures in the system of mandatory
reporting, though it is clear that mandatory rules did not serve us well. Rather, the corporate
governance crisis in America, with Enron as its poster child, represents a failure of both our
system of mandatory rules, and of the contracting processes, which, together, constitute the
infrastructure of the U.S. corporate governance system.").
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law had little or no economic support.3 9 Larry Ribstein at the University
of Illinois initially expressed opposition, sometimes in a cautionary40 4
manner, sometimes not . In time, his views became more consistently
severe, 42 characterizing SOX as a "debacle. 43  Stephen Bainbridge at
UCLA described SOX this way: "Congress and the regulators have
implemented a set of reforms that are deeply flawed. They have
adopted policies that have no empirical support or economic
justification. Worse yet, in doing so, they have eviscerated basic
federalism rules that have long served us well."" More recently, he
concluded that the Act "sacrificed the American economy at the altar of
short-term political gain."4 Professor Carney at Emory viewed SOX as
the possible death knell for community banks. 6
No provision escaped criticism. More independent directors and
increased authority for the audit committee would be ineffective,47 while
39. See Romano, supra note 7, at 1529-43. They included an independent audit
committee, the separating of accounting and auditing services, executive loans, and executive
certification. Id.
40. See Ribstein, supra note 15, at 58; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to
Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 279, 296 [hereinafter Ribstein, Sarbox].
41. "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act represents a hasty, panicked reaction of an electorate
looking for an easy fix to the apparent 'problem' that stock prices go down as well as up."
Robert W. Hamilton, Professor, Univ. of Tex. Sch. Of Law, The Seventh Annual Frankel
Lecture at the University of Houston Law Center: The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002
Style (Nov. 8, 2002), in 40 HoUS. L. REV. 1, 49 (2003).
42. Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, 3 N.Z. L. REV. 365, 382 (2005)
("In short, the first three years of SOX strongly suggest that it was, at best, an overreaction to
Enron and related problems and, at worst, ineffective and unnecessary.").
43. See also HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY
DEBACLE: WHAT WE'VE LEARNED; HOW TO Fix IT (forthcoming 2006) ("An understanding
of these high costs and minimal benefits, and of the forces that produced this misguided
legislation, may help to prevent a regulatory debacle in the future."). But see Ribstein,
Sarbox, supra note 40, at 296 ("Sarbanes-Oxley may prove to be a favorable development.").
44. See Bainbridge, Creeping Federalization, supra note 14, at 26.
45. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste, Repenting in Leisure,
15 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-14,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=899593. He adheres to the contractarian
approach. See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 11 ("In recent years, however, I have come around
to the view that the corporation is a nexus of contracts in a literal sense, albeit a very limited
one.").
46. Carney, supra note 3, at 160 ("With all of these changes, many of the smaller
companies that went public in the late 1990s and foreign issuers that entered the U.S. market
may wish to rethink their decision.... Say goodbye to the community bank that was owned
by the community.").
47. Romano, supra note 7, at 1533 ("The compelling thrust of the literature on the
composition of audit committees, in short, does not support the proposition that requiring
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increasing costs. 48 Greater independence for accountants was harmful. 49
The prohibition on loans to executive officers represented a public
policy error."°  Separating accounting and consulting firms could
negatively affect audit quality,5" while the costs of reviewing internal
controls outweighed the benefits.52
audit committees to consist solely of independent directors will reduce the probability of
financial statement wrongdoing or otherwise improve corporate performance.").
48. Ribstein, supra note 42, at 369-70 ("There is, however, a significant question as to
the effect of this specific fix [independent audit committee] on top of many regulators' myriad
pre-SOX efforts to reform corporate boards. That is particularly so given the inherent
difficulty of effective oversight of auditors, a task requiring significant information and
expertise. Thus, there is little reason in theory to expect this reform to do more than increase
governance costs.").
49. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 88 ("But increasing auditor independence may reduce
their access to information as well as their expertise, ability, and incentives. Also, separating
audit and non-audit services may move auditing to smaller, less reputable, and more
judgment-proof firms.").
50. Romano, supra note 7, at 1539 ("Because executive loans in many cases appear to
serve their purpose of increasing managerial stock ownership, thereby aligning managers' and
shareholders' interests, the blanket prohibition of executive loans in SOX is self-evidently a
public policy error.").
51. Id. at 1535-36 ("The overwhelming majority of the studies ... suggest that SOX's
prohibition of the purchase of nonaudit services from an auditor is an exercise in legislating
away a nonproblem. The majority... find no connection between the provision of nonaudit
services and audit quality."); Ribstein, supra note 42, at 374 ("Third, altering gatekeepers'
incentives in order to ensure their independence might negatively affect the overall quality of
services.").
52. Romano, supra note 7, at 1543 ("The brief review of the empirical literature suggests
that a case does not exist for the principal corporate governance mandates in SOX. The
decisive balance of research indicates that those mandates will not benefit investors.").
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IV. EXAMINING THE HOLES IN SOX53
With four years of experience, much of SOX can be examined in a
calmer, although still preliminary, context.- Stripping away the
ideology, it seems as if some of the provisions will likely result in
positive changes,55 although they may be modest. While at this stage the
Act could perhaps withstand some refinements, the changes would
likely be small and not undo any central thesis of the approach.56
A. Financial Disclosure
With respect to financial disclosure, SOX did two things of
significance. The first was to require certification of the financial
statements by the CEO and CFO." The second was to require annual
53. This Essay does not focus on the growing number of event studies that purport to
assess the market impact of the Act. These studies, which have not been consistent in result,
tend to focus on the market's reaction over an exceedingly brief period of time, usually a
matter of days. Given the uncertainties that pervaded the early days of SOX, the negative
market reaction in the short term would not be particularly surprising. See Unease on Wall
Street as Election Day Nears, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, (Business Desk), at C4 ("The stock
market hates uncertainty .... "). Whether a market penalty continues, however, is generally
not answered by these studies. Most of these studies have difficulty isolating the effects of
SOX from other contemporaneous developments. See Kate Litvak, The Effect of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-US Companies Cross-Listed in the US, (The Univ. of Tex. Sch. of
Law, Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 55, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=876624. Litvak examines two groups of foreign companies co-listed
in the United States, those subject to SOX and those not, and examines the market's reaction
to certain "significant" developments in the adoption and implementation process of SOX.
As a check, she pairs each foreign company with a similar company in the same industry, in
the same country, and with a similar size. She concludes that the data shows "evidence
consistent with the hypothesis that investors expected the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to have a net
negative effect on companies to which it applied." Id. at 36. The main weakness in the study
seems to be the dates defined as significant and not significant. In any event, the study does
little more than demonstrate a market reaction to the entire Act at various stages of
development, suggesting that the market's reaction was to uncertainty, rather than particular
provisions, something that would ultimately dissipate.
54. Portions of SOX still have not become applicable to small public companies. See
Internal Controls, Securities Act Release No. 8731, Exchange Act Release No. 54,295
[Current Volume] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T1 87,619, at 83,383 (Aug. 9, 2006).
55. Boards arguably are acting in a more independent fashion. See infra note 116.
56. Thus, for example, the prohibition on executive loans could be amended to permit
lending in areas unlikely to cause significant harm such as split-dollar insurance programs and
relocation assistance. For other areas, such as whether to permanently exempt small
companies from section 404, it is too early to determine. Even the Commission is having a
difficult time with the issue. See infra note 67 (noting four-year delay in application of section
404 to smaller companies).
57. See section 302 of SOX. See 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. II 2002); Commodity and
Securities Exchange, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1.3a-14 (2006).
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disclosure of an "internal control report," with the outside accountant
having to "attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the
management of the issuer. ,1
8
In drafting these provisions, Congress confronted an almost
complete void under state law.59 Early cases in Delaware suggested that
boards had no affirmative obligation to acquire information. They did
not have to implement systems designed to ensure that accurate
financial and other information made it to executive officers or
directors. 6' Later decisions took a somewhat different view but created
a standard that effectively allowed directors to avoid liability by
remaining ignorant about activities within the company.62
The changes made by SOX in this area generated the most obvious
set of costs emanating from the legislation and, as a result, made it the
favorite target.63 Section 40464 and its requirement that outside auditors
attest to a company's internal controls has been labeled, perhaps
58. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (Supp. 112002).
59. Contrary to the usual adage, ignorance was a defense. In some of the celebrated
criminal cases involving corporate fraud, CEOs took the position that they were not aware of
the financial manipulations. Prosecutors were left having to prove that they somehow knew.
In other words, there was not a sufficiently strong fiduciary obligation that required
knowledge.
60. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) ("[A]bsent
cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate
system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.").
61. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1136 (2003) ("In this sense
Sarbanes-Oxley can be seen as attempting to calibrate the mandatory disclosure system to a
world in which the board of a public corporation will have insufficient incentives to undertake
high-powered monitoring of corporate finance and, therefore, market monitoring must be
strengthened.").
62. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 366 (Del. Super.
Ct. 2006) ("We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for director
oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information
system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or
problems requiring their attention."); see also In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698
A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). Putting aside that Caremark was only a Court of Chancery
opinion, no subsequent decision ever found a company with inadequate internal procedures.
For a discussion of these cases, see Brown, supra note 21, at 345-47. For a discussion of the
evolution in the regulation of internal controls, see Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls
After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law's Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems
5-11 (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=808084.
63. For a list of possible costs, see Carney, supra note 3, at 144-52.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. II 2002).
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wrongly,65 the most expensive provision added by SOX.6 Studies have
attempted to quantify these costs, with most of the criticism focusing on
the disproportionate expenses incurred by smaller companies. 67
As an initial matter, it seems clear enough that SOX resulted in
increased out-of-pocket expenses for public companies. In quantifying
the costs, however, the data to date is generally weak and incomplete.
First, much of what is used is anecdotal 6' and often relies on
extrapolations from small samplings.69 Second, the amounts overstate
the continuing costs of SOX. They do not typically separate out
expenses that were a one-time event necessary to bring companies into
initial compliance, 70 a process that should become cheaper over time."
65. The costs emanating from this section are the most quantifiable and the most visible.
The most significant cost of SOX, one occasionally mentioned by others but not discussed in
great detail, may be the opportunity costs associated with CEO and CFO review in
connection with the certification process. To the extent officers decide to undertake
substantial due diligence in connection with the process, this is time taken away from running
the business. Of course, there may be business benefits that accompany a greater
understanding of the financial statements. Either way, this is a cost that is difficult to assess
with any accuracy, so it often gets ignored.
66. See Carney, supra note 3, at 142 ("Section 404 of SOX, the principal factor in
increased costs, deals strictly with financial statement issues, and leaves the rest of corporate
disclosure untouched.").
67. Bainbridge calls this "[t]he most troubling aspect of the dramatic increase in
compliance costs." Bainbridge, supra note 45, at 12. Interestingly, this has occurred despite a
four-year delay in implementation for smaller companies. See Internal Controls, Securities
Act Release No. 8545, Exchange Act Release No. 51,293 [2004-2005 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 87,335, at 81,841 (Mar. 2, 2005); see also Internal Controls, Securities
Act Release No. 8731, Exchange Act Release No. 54,295 [Current Volume] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 87,619, at 83,383 (Aug. 9, 2006).
68. Thus, for example, Carney undertakes his own assessment of costs by looking at
forty-four companies that engaged in "going private" transactions under Rule 13e-3 of the
Exchange Act. He acknowledged that seventeen of the companies were "quite small," with
profits or losses of less than $1 million. Carney, supra note 3, at 149. From these forty-four
cases, he estimates the losses at $500,000 per company and places the cost of "total
compliance" at $8 billion a year or, if capitalized at 3%, an even more impressive $266 billion.
Id. at 151.
69. A considerable amount of this data is cited by Carney. See Carney, supra note 3, at
147-48. Some rely on a study conducted by the law firm Foley & Lardner LLP. See id. at 148
n.54. The most recent version, dated June 15, 2006, involved the distribution of surveys to
"9,000 CEOs, CFOs, General Counsel, Chief Compliance Officers, Board Members,
Directors and other executives of both public companies and private organizations." FOLEY
& LARDNER, LLP, THE COST OF BEING PUBLIC IN THE ERA OF SARBANES-OXLEY 18 (Jun.
15, 2006). As the survey noted, responses were received from 114 public companies. While
the evidence is useful, it hardly seems comprehensive and could easily be prone to selective
response from companies feeling the most aggrieved by the impositions of SOX.
70. See Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric L. Talley, Going-Private Decisions
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis 19 (USC Center in Law,
Economics and Organization Research Paper Series, Paper No. C06-5, USC Legal Studies
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Third, some of the costs attributed to section 404 would have
occurred anyway, even had the provision never been adopted.72 To the
extent accounting firms were forced into a more distant, gatekeeper
role, it is reasonable to assume that their fees would rise, with or without
section 404.73 Moreover, while the gatekeeper role was enhanced by
other provisions of SOX, it is likely that even absent legislation,
accounting firms, in the aftermath of Enron and WorldCom, would have
gone in this direction in order to reduce legal exposure.
Similarly, the impact on smaller companies ignores the fact that
these companies are notorious for having poor internal accounting
systems. 74 Particularly as they grow in size, they will need to improve
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-10, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=901769
(reporting data showing adverse affect of SOX in first year but not in subsequent years).
71. Some of the costs arose at least in part from the uncertainty of the requirements. As
greater certainty descends and, frankly, cheaper alternatives develop, such as implementation
software, these costs should decline. See CFO RESEARCH SERVS. ET AL., COMPLIANCE AND
TECHNOLOGY: A SPECIAL REPORT ON PROCESS IMPROVEMENT AND AUTOMATION IN THE
AGE OF SARBANES-OXLEY 17 (2005) (a report prepared by CFO Research Services in
collaboration with Virsa Systems and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP) ("Sarbanes encourages
companies to focus on the areas of improvement the legislation is aimed at, and to do so in
the most efficient way possible-generally through greater automation. One executive points
out that his company now has a conscious policy of replacing manual with automated controls
and reporting every chance it gets. Not all are prepared to go that far, but most are moving
that way.").
72. U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-361, CONSIDERATION OF KEY
PRINCIPLES NEEDED IN ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMALLER PUBLIC
COMPANIES 18 (2006) ("These challenges were undoubtedly compounded in companies that
needed to make significant improvements in their internal control systems to make up for
deferred maintenance of those systems.").
73. The increase in costs likely was exacerbated by the oligopolistic nature of the
accounting industry, with companies having little choice on rates and services. There are four
independent accounting firms. They audit "98 percent of U.S. publicly traded company sales
(revenues)." U.S. GOv. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 72, at 8. Public companies in
many cases will use two of them, one for auditing and one for consulting services. Thus,
unhappy with services or charges, public companies have few alternatives.
74. Hating Higgs, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 2003, at 63 ("Simon Bartholomew of Russell
Reynolds, an executive-search company, says it is harder for small quoted companies to
recruit high-quality non-executives, because they often have weaker financial controls, their
boards carry less prestige and they pay less."); Charles Batchelor, Inventive Managers on
Course for Disaster, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Oct. 20, 1992, at 19 ("A survey of small,
high-tech companies showed the most common causes of crises were weak general
management, poor financial controls, product competition and problems in diversifying and
making acquisitions."); Carl Mortished, Flotations, TIMES, Dec. 30, 1997, at 22 ("Most small
companies are deservedly small. They are rotten investments because of their weak
managements, small markets and bad financial controls."); see also U.S. Gov.
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 72, at 14 ("Further, resource and expertise limitations
that characterize many smaller companies as well as their general lack of familiarity or
2006] CRITICIZING THE CRITICS
these systems. One suspects that SOX accelerated an improvement
process at least some of which would have, or should have, occurred
anyway.
The other data subset used to demonstrate the high cost of SOX
concerns the number of companies "going dark," those allowing the
number of shareholders of record to fall below 300.7' The consequences
of going dark are severe. No longer subject to the periodic reporting
requirements, 76 the companies cannot be traded on an exchange or the
Bulletin Board 7 and are limited to unregulated markets such as the
automated pink sheets. 8 In general, only the smallest of companies
with limited liquidity allow this to happen. 79
experience with formal internal control frameworks contributed to the challenges and
increased costs they faced during section 404 implementation.").
75. 15 U.S.C. 781(g) (Supp. II 2002); see Reporting Requirements-Smaller Public
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8666, Exchange Act Release No. 53,385, [2005-2006
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 87,523, at 83,062 (Feb. 28, 2006) ("An issuer
'goes dark' when holders of record of all classes of securities fall below the 300 holder
threshold and it files a Form 15 terminating its reporting obligations under Section 12(g) or
suspends its obligations under Section 15(d)."). Where this occurs, a company need only file
a Form 15 with the Commission. Filing this form immediately suspends the issuer's Exchange
Act reporting obligations. If, after ninety days from the date of filing the Form 15, the
Commission has not objected, the suspension becomes a permanent termination. See
Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4 (2006). A Form 15 does little
more than contain a representation about the number of shareholders. See Exchange Act
Release No. 20,784, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,508, at 86,669 (Mar. 30, 1984). A company
may also go dark by buying back shares or engaging in other transactions designed to reduce
the number below 300. In those circumstances, the company must file a Schedule 13E-3 with
the Commission and distribute the information to shareholders. Commodity and Services
Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(3) (2006).
76. A company with shares traded on an exchange must file periodic reports. See 15
U.S.C. § 781(b) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). Note that these are not the only companies that may
deregister and cease filing periodic reports. Until recently, NASDAQ required companies
listed in the automated trading system to register under section 12(g), thereby becoming
subject to the periodic reporting requirements. When NASDAQ qualified as an exchange,
see In the Matter of Nasdaq Stock Market LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 53,128, 71 Fed.
Reg. 3550 (Jan. 13, 2006), listed companies became subject to the reporting requirements
under section 12(b). To the extent they delist and have less than 300 shareholders of record,
they will not be required to file periodic reports.
77. See NASD, Manual Rule 6530 (2006), available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/
display/display.html?rbid=1189&elementjid=1159000866; Reporting Requirements-Smaller
Public Companies, supra note 75 at 83,055 ("Since 1999, the NASD has required companies
traded on its Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board ("OTCBB") to file reports under the
Exchange Act. Under Exchange Act rules, registrants must file annual and quarterly reports
disclosing information about their companies." (footnote omitted)).
78. In these markets, brokers cannot engage in trading activity unless they are in
possession of the information required by Rule 15c2-11 of the Exchange Act. Commodity
and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (2006). The pink sheets are an electronic
quotation system that has almost no requirements for listing. The name comes from the color
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The number of companies "going dark" because of SOX is hard to
discern. 8° A GAO report noted a post-SOX increase in the numbers, 8'
with some companies unsurprisingly giving as one explanation the costs
(including those imposed by SOX) of maintaining public company
status. 2 Nonetheless, the numbers are at best modest, increasing from
143 in 2001, the last full year before the adoption of SOX, to 245 in 2004;
of paper used when the quotes were printed in hard copy. See Phlocorp., S.E.C., Initial
Decision Release No. 304 at n.4 (Feb. 17, 2006 ) (admin. proc.) ("The Pink Sheets is an
electronic inter-dealer quotation system that displays quotes and last-sale information for
many over-the-counter securities. The name comes from the color of paper used when the
sheets circulated in hard copy. Unlike the OTCBB, the Pink Sheets does not require
companies whose securities are quoted on its system to meet any listing requirements. Many
of the companies listed on the Pink Sheets do not file periodic reports or audited financial
statements with the Commission."). For a nice article describing the obligations (or lack
thereof) of companies traded in the Pink Sheets, see Michael K. Molitor, Will More Sunlight
Fade the Pink Sheets? Increasing Public Information About Non-Reporting Issuers with
Quoted Securities, 39 IND. L. REV. 309 (2006).
79. They likely fall under the definition of micro-cap stocks, a group of companies that
raise continuing concern over fraud. See Specified Information, Exchange Act Release No.
41,110, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,121, at 81,871 (Feb. 25, 1999)
("Because incidents of fraud and manipulation involving micro-cap securities are a serious
concern, the Commission, along with other regulators, has made combating micro-cap fraud
one of its top priorities."). For one definition of micro-caps, see Smaller Public Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 8666, Exchange Act Release No. 53,385, [2005-2006 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 87,523, at 83,031 (Feb. 28, 2006) ("[C]ompanies whose
outstanding common stock (or equivalent) in the aggregate comprises the lowest 1% of total
U.S. equity market capitalization" (i.e., companies with equity capitalizations below
approximately $128 million) would qualify as micro-cap companies.).
80. Even before the adoption of SOX, the number of companies "going dark" was on an
upward trajectory. See U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 72, at 22. The
GAO analysis does not take into account the impact of the weaker stock market.
81. Id. at 21 ("[T]he number of public companies that went private has increased
significantly from 143 in 2001 to 245 in 2004, with the greatest increase occurring during 2003.
However, the 245 companies represented 2 percent of public companies as of January 31,
2004. Based on the trends observed in 2003 and 2004 and the 80 companies that went private
in the first quarter of 2005, we project that the number of companies going private will have
risen more than 87 percent, from the 143 in 2001 to a projected 267 through the end of 2005."
(footnote omitted)).
82. It was not, however, the only factor. See id. at 24 ("From 1999 to 2004, more
companies cited market and liquidity issues than the indirect costs associated with
maintaining their public company status. Companies in this category cited a wide variety of
issues related to the company's publicly traded stock such as a lack of analyst coverage and
investor interest, poor stock market performance, limited liquidity (trading volume), and
inability to use the secondary market to raise additional capital.").
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less than two percent of all public companies.83 Moreover, in terms of
size, they are small' and trade in the least liquid markets. 8
Others have studied leveraged buyouts ("LBOs") and "going
private" transactions. 6 Data suggests that in the first few years after the
adoption of SOX the number of these transactions increased, although
again, the numbers are modest." These types of transactions occur for a
variety of reasons,' with the cost of remaining public only one factor. 9
While SOX no doubt played a role on the margins (as did the costs
associated with remaining public in general),' attributing the increase,
or even a significant portion of the increase, to the Act is a stretch.
LBOs typically involve the repurchase of shares from public
stockholders at a premium financed mostly by borrowing, using the
assets of the company as leverage. Thus, the cost of the shares is the key
variable. 9' Even before the adoption of SOX, share prices essentially
collapsed, only reaching bottom in late 2002.' The decline made LBO
83. Id. at 21. The number overstates their importance. As a percentage of revenues or
assets of public companies, they would likely constitute a substantially smaller percentage.
See id. at 21-22.
84. Id. at 21-22 ("Our analysis also indicated that companies going private during this
entire period were disproportionately small by any measure (market capitalization, revenue,
or assets).").
85. In fact, 25% traded in no market at all. Another 37% were traded in the OTC
Bulletin Board and 14% in the Pink Sheets. The remaining percentages were as follows:
NASDAQ (17.6%); AMEX (5.3%) and NYSE (1.8%). Id. at 25.
86. See Carney, supra note 3, at 153-59.
87. According to Carney, there were sixty-five LBOs in 2001 and 114 in 2004. Id. at 157.
This is hardly enough growth to justify any conclusions about SOX even if they were all
attributable to the Act, particularly given that many of them were small.
88. In fact, they may also be a mechanism used by management to "hide" from the
judgment of the market. Brown, supra note 29, at 59.
89. See Carney, supra note 3, at 158 ("One of the difficulties with the data is that it
doesn't discriminate between companies that go private simply because stock prices have
declined drastically in some segments of the stock market and those that find the increasing
costs of remaining public a sufficient motivation.").
90. Moreover, to assume that in LBOs companies avoid the costs of SOX is to assume
that in the post-LBO environment, companies dispense with audited financial statements. In
fact, this is likely not true. They would probably still need them for bank loans and to
maintain financial records should the purchasers ever want again to bring the company
public. See Jaclyne Badal & Phred Dvorak, Theory & Practice: Sarbanes-Oxley Gains
Adherents, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2006, at B3.
91. As nonacademics note, LBOs need "cheap stock." John Dizard, Leveraged Buyouts
Fail to Appear on the Radar Screen, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Apr. 25, 2006, at 14 ("The
cheap stock part is also necessary. We know, for example, there will be no LBO of
Google.").
92. The NASDAQ was trading at 4234.33 on September 1, 2000. From September of
2000 through January 2001, the NASDAQ dropped 45.9% to 2291.86. In October of 2002,
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transactions more viable and, predictably, the numbers increased. Share
prices on the NYSE recovered by late 2005 and 2006. 9' Unsurprisingly,
the number of LBOs appears to have declined.94
Whether relying on costs associated with compliance or the number
of companies "going dark" or engaging in LBOs, the analysis places
little or no weight on the benefits associated with the reforms.
Certainly, reforming internal controls will not "prevent" all fraud,95
although reducing the control of the CEO and CFO over the finances by
empowering the audit committee and accounting firms will prevent
some instances of it. 96 Whether that alone will prove to be enough to
justify the reforms and their attendant costs is an empirical question not
ready to be answered.
But focusing solely on the prevention of fraud deliberately
understates the benefits of SOX. More broadly, the Act also increases
investor confidence in the efficacy of corporate disclosure, 7 something
that will likely follow from an improvement in the integrity of financial
the NASDAQ dropped as low as 1,108.49, a 78.4% drop from its all-time high of 5,132.52 in
March of 2000. The Standard & Poor's ("S&P") 500 stock index closed at an all-time high of
1527 on March 24, 2000. Since then, the index has declined by about 28% to 1097 as of May
14, 2002, roughly where it was four years ago. The Dow hit an all time high of 11,723 on
January 14, 2000. In October 2002, the market had fallen to 7286.
93. The NYSE has returned to dot com heights, with the Dow Jones hitting record highs
in October 2006. The NASDAQ has not, although October brought five year highs. See
Dow Sets 4th Record Close in a Row, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at C4.
94. Going Private is Going Out of Fashion, SARBANES OXLEY COMPLIANCE J., Mar. 31,
2005, http://www.s-ox.com/news/detail.cfm?articlelD=731 ("The number of U.S. companies
seeking to go private decreased by nearly 50 percent in 2004, dropping from almost 100 in
2003 to less than 50 last year. It is the first year since 2001 that the number of initial public
offerings exceeded the number of companies wanting to go private.").
95. Carney, supra note 3, at 142 ("These new procedures will not prevent all or even
most financial fraud."); see also Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the
Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 251, 291 (2005) ("Yet one of the deepest ironies of SOX is that corporate America's
expensive process of renovating internal controls pursuant to section 404 seems unlikely to
forestall the kinds of high-level frauds that triggered public outcry and governance reform.").
96. One commentator noted that "there is circumstantial evidence suggesting that
incremental improvements in fraud detection because of section 404 are likely to be modest"
but then conceded that "[t]o be sure, the presence of internal controls may prevent or deter
some frauds in the first place, and detection patterns may change in a world of controls
improved by section 404, but it would be good to have evidence of such effects." Clark, supra
note 95, at 294. While statistics may be absent, note the connection between instances of
fraud and smaller companies. See Exchange Act Release No. 41,110, supra note 79.
97. Clark, supra note 95, at 308 ("The reforms may yet prove to be beneficial on
balance, especially if the hoped-for general effect on investor trust is real.").
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statements.18  After all, most inaccuracies do not result from fraud.
Companies may have inaccurate financial statements because they do
not rigorously follow existing requirements or do not have adequate
internal controls. 99
This can be seen from the decision by foreign companies to accept
higher costs in return for increased investor confidence. The United
States is often viewed as a gold standard for purposes of accurate and
complete disclosure, and foreign markets reward companies that meet
these standards.'00 As a result, foreign companies often list in the
United States not because they want to raise capital but because of the
resulting increase in share prices that comes with increased investor
confidence.' 1 The reforms implemented by SOX arguably continue this
approach.
Whatever the direct impact on investor confidence, SOX has
apparently had some effect on the accuracy of financial disclosure."
98. See U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 72, at 1 ("Regulators, public
companies, audit firms, and investors generally agree that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has
had a positive and significant impact on investor protection and confidence.").
99. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight
Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 267, 277 (2004) ("Historically, financial
controls were intended to promote fair financial reporting, though after SOX they
increasingly are intended to prevent fraud."); David Reilly, Restatement Blame: Basic
Mistakes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2006, at C4 (noting that research by the SEC on the reasons
for restatements found that 55% of restatements were due to "basic mistakes with nuts and
bolts accounting").
100. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 673-76 (1999); see also
Neeraj Bhargava, Good Governance is Good Business, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2006, at A12
("Headlines are likely to continue to assert that stringent financial reporting and corporate
governance guidelines are diminishing the prestige of a U.S. listing and driving companies to
international exchanges. And yes, meeting the highest listing standards in the world does
come at a price. But the benefits continue to outweigh the challenges and to drive companies
toward greater efficiency, stability and long-term growth.").
101. They may also be more responsive to investor needs and concerns. See Ugur Lel &
Darius P. Miller, International Cross-listing, Firm Performance and Top Management
Turnover: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis 29 (Sept. 1, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=926606 (foreign firms cross-listed in the US are more likely to shed
underperforming CEOs than noncross-listed firms and that "this effect is concentrated in
cross-listings on major U.S. exchanges with the strongest investor protections").
102. Some of the increase may have occurred in the post-Enron environment, even
without SOX. Nonetheless, SOX appears to have played a significant role. See U.S. Gov.
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-678, UPDATE OF PUBLIC COMPANY TRENDS, MARKET
IMPACTS, AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 11-12 (2006) ("Some industry
observers noted that several factors may have prompted more U.S. publicly traded companies
to restate previously reported financial results, including (1) the financial reporting
requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, especially the certification of financial reports
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The number of restatements has increased significantly since its
adoption,"3 particularly among larger companies." The overvaluation
that resulted from the inaccurate financial statements was estimated at
$63 billion on an adjusted basis. °5
B. Audit Committees and Independent Directors
SOX made two broad changes to the audit committee structure.
106
First, it limited the committee to independent directors,"° with the
definition of "independent" substantially tougher than anything used by
either the self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") or Delaware, 1°8 and it
encouraged the committee to include directors with some degree of
expertise."M Second, the audit committee obtained clear and expanded
required by Section 302 and the internal controls provisions of Section 404; (2) increased
scrutiny from the newly formed PCAOB through its inspections of registered public
accounting firms; and (3) increased staffing and review by SEC.").
103. Id. at 4 ("While the number of companies announcing financial restatements from
2002 through September 2005 rose from 3.7 percent to 6.8 percent, restatement
announcements identified grew about 67 percent over this period."); see also Reilly, supra
note 99 (noting that 1,195 restatements occurred in 2005, up from 270 in 2001, with more than
1,300 expected in 2006).
104. See U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 102, at 4 ("The median size
(by market capitalization) of restating companies increased from $282 million in 2002 to $672
million in 2005.").
105. Id. at 5 ("The market capitalization of the companies-those we were able to
analyze from among the listed companies that we identified as announcing restatements of
previously reported information between July 2002 and September 2005-decreased an
estimated $63 billion when adjusted for overall market movements ($43 billion unadjusted) in
the days around the initial restatement announcement.").
106. Section 303 also requires the adoption of rules prohibiting interference with an
audit. 15 U.S.C. § 7242 (Supp. II 2002).
107. By including them as rules of the SRO, Congress dramatically reduced the
possibility of private enforcement action. See J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 15.04[2][g] (3d ed. 2006). If the requirements subsequently prove
ineffective, the absence of this type of enforcement mechanism may provide a significant
explanation.
108. In effect, directors sitting on the committee could receive no compensation from
the company, directly or indirectly, other than fees. For a discussion of the Delaware
definition of independence and its analytical inconsistencies, see J. Robert Brown, Jr.,
Disloyalty without Limits: Independent Directors and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty,
95 KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
109. SOX does not require financial expertise. Instead, the Commission must issue rules
requiring reporting companies "to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefor,
the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of at least [one] member who is a financial
expert, as such term is defined by the Commission." 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (Supp. II 2002). The
Commission codified the requirements in Item 401 of Regulation S-K. See SEC Regulation
S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (2005). The NYSE now requires financial expertise on the audit
committee. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A(7) (2006). At least among
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jurisdiction, receiving "direct" responsibility "for the appointment,
compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered public
accounting firm employed by that issuer"" and a guarantee of
"appropriate funding." l
It is hard, from a common sense perspective, to see the harm in
requiring greater independence 2  and expertise on the audit
committee."3  Those opposing the changes have focused on studies
suggesting that director independence generally, and on the audit
committee specifically, does not increase shareholder value or reduce
the probability of financial statement wrongdoing."
The studies illustrate the weakness of resolving all issues by relying
upon off-the-shelf economic analysis. The studies generally pre-date
SOX ,' and focus on the role of independent directors. SOX, however,
did more than require independence. It provided for expertise,
mandatory jurisdiction, and guaranteed funding. Studying one aspect of
SOX without considering the impact of the others renders the whole
approach suspect." 6  Moreover, the studies have an inherent
Fortune 500 companies, the presence of financial expertise has become ubiquitous. Alix
Nyberg Stuart, Can You Spot the Finance Expert?, CFO MAG., Sept. 2005.
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. II 2002). The requirements were to be
implemented as mandatory listing standards by the exchanges.
111. See Ribstein, supra note 42, at 369.
112. Some have tried. See Romano, supra note 7, at 1530 (surveying studies and
suggesting that "independent boards do not improve performance and that boards with too
many outsiders may, in fact, have a negative impact on performance").
113. One of the silliest is the notion that the pool of eligible directors will somehow get
smaller. See E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 441, 448 (2003) ("Two things
are likely to happen. One is the near certainty that the Enron fallout and Sarbanes-Oxley will
shrink the universe of willing and qualified candidates who would agree to be elected as
directors."). It is another way of saying that by making the job harder and increasing the
work load, some will have less interest in serving on the board, a fair enough statement. That
there will not be an adequate pool of possible directors does not at all follow from that
conclusion and, in fact, may make room for greater diversity. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The
Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for
Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 795, 805 ("More specifically, reform
measures that require corporations to have more independent directors can have a positive
impact on the number of directors of color.").
114. Romano, supra note 7, at 1529-33.
115. Id. at 1604.
116. This is particularly important since common sense suggests that independence in
isolation will not automatically have a positive impact on companies. The term generally
applies to persons not under the control of the CEO. See Brown, supra note 108. The mere
absence of a particular type of relationship does not in any way guarantee the presence of
other qualities necessary for effective management. Thus, independence alone does not
necessarily mean the director will have the knowledge or force of personality to act in an
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weakness. 117  Neither the definition used by Delaware"8 nor the
exchanges'19 truly ensures independence. The studies, even those
attempting to compensate for some of these deficiencies, 2 ° suffer from
comparable flaws.' 2
In any event, companies have implemented the requirements, and
some opportunities exist to study how things are working in practice.
Since the adoption of SOX, the number of financial restatements from
large public companies has increased significantly.'22 Presumably, at
least some of the increase resulted from the newly reconstituted audit
committees.
C. Executive Loans
The restriction on executive loans is perhaps the most obvious
categorical prohibition in the Act. Section 402 of SOX imposes an
almost absolute ban 23 on extensions of credit to executive officers and
independent fashion. There may be some specific circumstances where independence alone
has value. For example, the insertion of independent directors might prove beneficial to a
board viewed by the market as excessively under the control of an underperforming CEO.
Of course, this effect could also occur by the replacement of captive independent directors
with less captive ones or incompetent directors with competent ones.
117. Some evidence indicates the approach may be working and directors may be acting
in a more independent fashion. See Alan Murray, Leash Gets Shorter for Beleaguered CEOs,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2006, at A2 ("The firing of a CEO used to be a rare event-even the
worst of them often managed to cling to power with remarkable tenacity. In the past two
years, however, CEO firings have become commonplace.").
118. For a discussion of the problems with the approach used by Delaware in
determining independence, see Brown, supra note 108.
119. The exchanges do not, for example, deal with the impact of personal relationships.
120. While studies of audit committees have attempted to identify independent outside
directors and use a definition similar to the one in SOX, see Romano, supra note 7, at 1530-
31, the data presumably suffers from the limits imposed by the public disclosure system.
Thus, the proxy rules only require the disclosure of relating party transactions to the extent
exceeding $60,000. As a result, not all arrangements will necessarily be disclosed. Moreover,
sometimes companies do not properly disclose all required information about the potential
conflicts of directors. See In re Disney, Exchange Act Release No. 50,882 (Dec. 20, 2004)
(admin. proc.) (failing to disclose certain director relationships).
121. See Clark, supra note 95, at 300 (discussing independent director studies and noting
that "independent directors may not be truly independent, because whatever the formal
procedures, they are de facto selected by management, and they have insufficient personal
incentive to act very independently").
122. See U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 102, at 114.
123. Some have suggested that Congress should consider more narrow categorical
prohibitions designed not to exclude all loans. See Jayne W. Barnard, Historical Quirks,
Political Opportunism, and the Anti-Loan Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 31 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 325, 353-56 (2005) (proposing that Congress study particular abuses arising in the
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directors,1 24 although it is also one of the easiest to circumvent.1 25  The
provision amounted to a direct intrusion into state fiduciary duties.
Because loans sometimes benefited the corporation 2 6 and sometimes
did not,'27 the matter had traditionally been left to the discretion of the
board of directors.12s After SOX, this was no longer the case.
The provision was inserted into SOX in response to a number of
abuses associated with loans to CEOs of large public companies. These
loans demonstrated a fundamental weakness in the development of
fiduciary obligations. As with any self-interested transaction, loans to
directors or officers on the board were examined under the duty of
loyalty.' 29  The test mandated that the transactions be fair to the
corporation. Fairness in the context of a loan was not a particularly
difficult standard. In general, it was enough to show that the terms of
the loan compared favorably to those made by "unrelated lenders.'
130
context of executive loans and consider amendments); see also supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp. II 2002).
125. Some have complained that the provision will inhibit stock ownership by executive
officers and directors by prohibiting stock loans. See Ribstein, supra note 42, at 373 ("The
problem with this regulation is that such loans have the potential benefit of encouraging
insider ownership of company stock, which tends to align their interests with those of the
shareholders."). This criticism ignores the fact that the company can, of course, give the
officer or director the shares directly or derivative securities such as stock appreciation rights,
in both cases obviating the need for any loan.
126. Thus, Romano is correct in noting that the provision "is a blunderbuss approach
that prohibits all loans, whether or not they are useful in facilitating the shareholders'
objective of providing a sought-after incentive effect." Romano, supra note 7, at 1540. Of
course, so does every categorical rule that affects shareholder objectives.
127. The WorldCom loans to Bernie Ebbers, for example. DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET
AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM., INC. 292-93 (Mar. 31, 2003) ("We believe these
loans and guaranties were contrary to the interests of WorldCom and its shareholders.
Indeed, we do not understand how the Compensation Committee or the Board could have
concluded that these loans were in the best interests of the Company or an acceptable use of
more than $400 million of the shareholders' money. These decisions reflected an uncritical
solicitude for Ebbers' financial interests, and an insufficient focus on the shareholders'
interests.").
128. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 971-72 (2003) (labeling section 402 as the "type of limitation that
more traditional minds might think should flow from the chartering states, rather than from
the federal government").
129. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary
Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1211 (2004).
130. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 (Del. 1987).
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Delaware courts, however, eliminated the requirement of fairness,
replacing it with process.' The transaction only needed to be approved
by a board consisting of a majority of independent and disinterested
directors. 132 Once done, the loan would be reviewed under the business
judgment rule, 13  rendering the actual terms of the transaction largely
irrelevant.
The use of the business judgment rule, while never fully explained,
was hard to justify.1" For one thing, the courts did nothing to exclude
the interested influence. The interested director could participate in the
discussion and vote on the matter. It was enough that a "majority" of
the board be independent and disinterested.
More importantly, the business judgment rule was an over-inclusive
protection designed to encourage managerial risk-taking. 135 As such, the
approach allowed some instances of mismanagement to go
unpunished.' The logic behind the presumption did not apply where
the transaction was motivated not by risk-taking but by self-interest.
The poster child for the consequences of this approach was the loans
and guarantees made to Bernie Ebbers, the CEO of WorldCom. The
total amount ultimately exceeded $400 million and occurred at a time of
financial difficulty for WorldCom. Two of the three members of the
131. See Brown, supra note 108.
132. See id.
133. The only significant exception was a transaction between the company and a
controlling shareholder. In those circumstances, approval by independent directors shifts the
burden of proof, with shareholders having the burden of proving the unfairness of the
transaction. See id.
134. Approval of a conflict of interest transaction by a majority of independent and
disinterested directors apparently purged the disloyal taint and justified the application of the
business judgment rule. See id. In fact, however, the conflict was still very much present.
The approach used by Delaware did not guarantee that in fact the directors making the
decision were independent. Nor did it even require that the conflict be removed from the
deliberation process. So long as approved by a majority of independent directors, the
interested party could participate in the discussions and even vote on the matter.
135. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1299
n.43 (2001) ("When it took that step, the law reflected the policy concern that an overly
aggressive approach to enforcing the duty of care could deter risk-taking and discourage
service on corporate boards by qualified candidates."); see also George W. Dent, The Power
of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit, 75 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 96, 135 (1980) (stating that the business judgment rule "insulate[s] from liability
directors who have made mistaken decisions resulting in corporate losses, notwithstanding
their good faith and exercise of due care").
136. Thus, liability may not be imposed for negligent mismanagement. Delaware courts
require at least a showing of grossly negligent mismanagement. See Brainbridge, supra note
14, at 562-63. In fact, the standard is probably higher.
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compensation committee'37 had extensive interaction with Ebbers and,
while meeting the NYSE definition of independent, were considered
"poor choices" to represent the interests of the corporation. 3 The
loans were made on highly favorable terms139 and involved an
assumption of risk "that no financial institution was willing to
assume." 140
Nonetheless, so long as they were approved by directors who met
the state law definition of independent' and otherwise conformed to
the duty of care, a decidedly low standard,' 42 the loans were beyond
challenge.'43 Ebbers ultimately defaulted and most of the loans remain
uncollected.'"
Had the board retained the obligation to show the fairness of the
loans, they probably never would have occurred. At a minimum,
137. As one report concluded: "The Compensation Committee of the board seemed to
spend most of its efforts finding ways to enrich Ebbers, and it certainly did not act as a serious
outside watchdog against excessive payments or dangerous incentives." Richard C. Breeden,
Corporate Monitor, Restoring Trust: Report to the Hon. Jed S. Rakoff on Corporate
Governance for the Future of MCI, Inc. 25 (Aug. 2003).
138. Id. at 28 n.27 ("Both Kellett and Bobbitt appeared to satisfy the 'independence'
standards for directors of the time, and might well satisfy current definitions used by the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and NASDAQ. However, both men had received millions
of dollars worth of WorldCom stock when Ebbers acquired predecessor companies. Both
men had been involved in business with Ebbers for years, and both owed a substantial portion
of their net worth to his actions. This made them uniquely poor choices to represent the
interests of WorldCom's shareholders in exercising oversight responsibilities over Ebbers. As
demonstrated by their actions in extending stockholder loans to bail out Ebbers' personal
debts, both men seemed to be more solicitous of Ebbers' wishes than shareholder interests.").
139. BERESFORD ET AL., supra note 127, at 292 ("The Company did not have a
perfected security interest in any collateral for the loans for most of the time period during
which they were outstanding."); see also id. at 304-05 ("Ebbers was not required to make
regular payments; rather, payments were required only on the Company's demand, and no
payments were demanded. The promissory notes provided that the interest charged to
Ebbers would be equal to the fluctuating rate of interest charged under a WorldCom credit
facility, almost always the lowest rate available to WorldCom at the time, and a rate of
interest lower than that of Ebbers' other outside loans. Moreover, this rate was lower than
the average rate WorldCom paid on its other debt.").
140. Id. at 292.
141. WorldCom was incorporated in Georgia. The company eventually changed its
name to MCI and reincorporated in Delaware. This analysis assumes the Delaware standard
applies.
142. See Brehm v. Eisner, No. 411, 2006 Del. LEXIS 307, at *54-58 (Jun. 8, 2006).
143. As one report concluded: "[W]e do not understand how the Compensation
Committee or the Board could have concluded that these loans an acceptable use of more
than $400 million of the shareholders' money." BERESFORD ET AL., supra note 127, at 32.
144. Some of Ebbers' assets were seized and sold to pay down the loan. The company
filed an action in the Bankruptcy Court seeking a judgment for the full amount due under the
note. See MCI Corp., Form 10-K/A (Jan. 5, 2006) (filed with the SEC).
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fairness would have required commercially reasonable terms. With the
decision subject to the business judgment rule, the terms and fairness of
the transaction hardly mattered.
It was this void that Congress entered in banning executive loans by
public companies."5 Thus, the issue is not whether the prohibition
results in inefficiencies or additional costs, but whether these
consequences are more costly and inefficient than the approach
employed under Delaware common law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Contractarians add a valuable perspective on corporate law,
particularly the insight into the usefulness of enabling rules over
mandatory rules.
The approach, however, has no presumption in practice.T 146  In
addressing reform, adherents must make the affirmative case that the
costs of any particular provision outweigh the benefits. Relying on weak
empirical data about costs while understating benefits will be
unconvincing. So will criticisms of a categorical approach solely because
it is categorical. Defending the status quo without addressing its
weaknesses will lack credibility.
This has been particularly true in the context of SOX. It is true that
the Act was adopted in a political flurry, precipitated by scandal. None
of that changes the fact that, in the aftermath of Enron and WorldCom,
there were serious problems with the U.S. system of disclosure and
governance. WorldCom succeeded in understating expenses by $10
billion, Enron in creating an $80 billion Potemkin village, and these
were only a few of the extraordinary financial scandals during the
period.1 47 While there may be an "optimal amount of fraud,"'' 48 nothing
145. The consensus European approach seems to favor categorical rules in some cases.
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 22, at 20 (noting that "abusive
self-dealing should be prohibited").
146. Some would disagree with this. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory
Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L. 657, 721 (1996) ("When a firm
and a union representing its workers contract for strategic participation, the basic economic
principle of voluntary exchange allows us to assume that the agreement is mutually beneficial.
No such presumption, however, attaches to strategic participation imposed by government
fiat.").
147. For a convenient list, see David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The
Possibility of a Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 65-67 (2003).
148. Carney, supra note 3, at 141 (quoting Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free
Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 67 (1973)).
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about the Enron-WorldCom era seems optimal; suggestions to turn back
the clock are myopic. 19
Similarly, asserting that Delaware corporate law is, in general, the
most efficient does not automatically require the conclusion that
everything done within the state results in greater efficiency.'5 ° In the
context of the duty of loyalty, the approach of the Delaware courts has
been to more or less eliminate the fairness analysis from conflict of
interest transactions."' The result is that conflict of interest transactions
are not subject to serious limits. SOX tried to undue part of this
approach.
The permanent effects of SOX may eventually become clear enough
and susceptible to isolation to permit assessment. That day has not yet
arrived.
149. See Romano, supra note 7, at 1529 ("The central policy recommendation of this
Article is that the corporate governance provisions of SOX should be stripped of their
mandatory force and rendered optional for registrants.").
150. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 26, at 1789.
151. See Brown, supra note 21, at 335.
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